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Plaintiffs and Appellants Phillip A. Alf and Kathryn B. Alf
(Alfs) submit this Reply Brief in response to Defendant and
Appellee State Farm Fire and Casualty Company's (State Farm) Brief
of Respondent.

The majority of State Farm's arguments raised in

its brief are addressed in Alfs1 original brief.

However, Alfs

will here amplify certain points and draw the Court's attention to
several inaccuracies in the application of law contained in State
Farm's brief in order to clarity the issues and define the proper
resolution of these issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
1.

Plaintiffs are individuals, husband and wife, residing in

the City of Draper, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant State Farm Fire and Casualty Company is a

corporation licensed and authorized to conduct insurance business
in the State of Utah.
3.

On

or

about

March

8,

1988,

Plaintiffs,

through

Defendant's agent, Fred R. Jensen, purchased a home owners policy
of insurance on their home and premises in Draper, Utah.
4.

At all times material hereto, said policy was in effect.

5.

On or about February 15, 1989, while said policy was in

full force and effect, and during a time when the home was fully
occupied by Plaintiffs and not under construction, the main water
line to the home, in an area where it runs under the tennis court
on said premises, and through the residence of the Plaintiffs,

^hese facts are taken verbatim from the January 17, 1990,
Stipulated Statements of Fact, R. 40-41 (Stipulated Facts).

froze and burst as a result of unusually low temperatures occurring
in the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.
6.

As a result of the freezing and bursting of the main

water line, large volumes of water escaped from the water line
causing extensive flooding and washing away of the earth under the
tennis court, driveway, fences and other structures on Plaintiffs'
premises and causing damage to those structures.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The lower court erred, as a matter of law, in its summary
judgment

ruling

because

Village

Inn

v.

State

Farm

is

not

determinative of the issue of law before this Court because it does
not address efficient proximate cause. Alfs advanced the efficient
proximate cause argument in the lower court, the lower court based
its summary judgment ruling entirely on the Village Inn case, and
Village Inn does not address the issue of efficient proximate
cause.

According to the stipulated Statement of Facts and the

Findings of Facts, the efficient proximate cause is the "freezing
and bursting of the main water line."
Further, summary judgment as decided, was improper because the
determination of efficient proximate cause is a factual issue
properly decided by the trier of fact.

Efficient proximate cause

is the law in Utah, the determination of efficient proximate cause
is a matter for the trier of fact, and the stipulation of the
parties does not support a determination that earth movement was
the efficient proximate cause.

Therefore, Summary Judgment as

decided was improper.
2

ARGUMENT
Point I
The Lower Court Erred, as a Matter of Law, in
its Summary Judgment Ruling because Village
Inn v. State Farm is Not Determinative of the
Issue of Law Before This Court Because it Does
Not Address Efficient Proximate Cause
Alfs requested that the Lower Court apply the efficient
proximate cause rule to resolve the relevant issue: Did earth
movement cause the damage or was the damage caused by the "freezing
and bursting of the main water line."

In other words, where one

cause ("freezing of a plumbing . . . or sprinkler system"2) is
covered and the other possible cause

("earth movement"3) was

excluded, which was the efficient proximate cause?

Even though

there is ample basis in the Statement of Facts to make a finding of
fact and conclusion of law that the "freezing and bursting of the
main water line" was the efficient proximate cause, the Lower Court
side-stepped this issue, made no finding of fact or conclusion of
law relating to efficient proximate cause, and based its ruling
entirely on the Village Inn case—a case which does not even
address efficient proximate cause.
A.
Alfs

Alfs Advanced the Efficient Proximate Cause
Argument in the Lower Court
argued

in their

Opposition

Memorandum

at

Summary

Judgment4 and again in their Brief on Appeal5 that the efficient
2

Home Owner's Extra Policy, §I-Losses Insured, 514.

3

Home Owner's Extra Policy, Si-Losses Not Insured, 12b.

4

March 26, 1990, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment, pp. 17-20.
3

proximate cause of the damage was "the freezing and bursting of the
main water line."6
The parties have stipulated:
As a result of the freezing and bursting of
the main water line, large volumes of water
escaped from the water line causing extensive
flooding and washing away of soil undermining
the tennis court, driveway, fences and other
structures on Plaintiffs' premises and causing
damage thereto.7
B.

The Lower Court Based its Summary Judgment
Ruling Entirely on the Village Inn case

It is also undisputed that the lower court squarely rested its
Summary Judgment ruling on the Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm
Fire and Casualty Company8 case.

The lower court concluded, as a

matter of law:
The Court finds that the case of Village Inn
Apartments v. State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company, 131 Utah Adv. Rpt. 92, is governing
and there is no coverage for Plaintiffs'
losses and Defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.9
C_s

Village Inn Does Not Address the Issue of
Efficient Proximate Cause

However, Village Inn does not address efficient proximate
cause.

Village Inn does not even mention the phrases "efficient

proximate cause" or "proximate cause."
5

Brief on Appeal, pp. 9, 12-13.

Stipulated Facts, 56.
7

Id.

8

790 P . 2 d 581 (Utah App.

9

November 1 4 , 1 9 9 0 , C o n c l u s i o n s of Law, 5 1 .

1990).

4

Simply put, the lower court erred in its reliance upon Village
Inn as a basis for granting Summary Judgment in favor of State
Farm. The unresolved and unaddressed relevant issue is whether the
"predominant or efficient proximate cause of the loss was the
accidental freezing and bursting of the plumbing system,"10 which,
it is undisputed, is a peril clearly covered by the policy:
SECTION I - LOSSES INSURED
COVERAGE B - PERSONAL PROPERTY
We insure for accidental direct physical loss
to property described in coverage B caused by
the following perils, except as provided in
SECTION I - LOSSES NOT INSURED:
•

. •

14, Freezing of a plumbing, heating, air
conditioning or automatic fire protective
sprinkler system, or a house-hold appliance11.
P. According to the Stipulated Statement of Facts
and the Findings of Fact, the Efficient Proximate
Cause is the "Freezing and Bursting of the
Main Water Line"
There can be no question as to what caused and the other
secondary causes and set them in motion in this case.

The

Stipulated Facts recite, "As a result of the freezing and bursting
of the main water line . . . " soil washed away.

Therefore, the

proximate cause of the damage—as stipulated by the parties—was
the frozen and broken pipes.

The frozen and broken pipes caused

and set in motion in the other subsequent and secondary causes
which—although they were closer to the damage—were nevertheless
"a result" of the broken and frozen pipes.

10

March 26, 1990, Opposition Memorandum, p. 17.

"November 14, 1990, Findings of Fact, Ex. A, Your State Farm
Homeowners Extra Policy.
5

The issue of efficient proximate cause is not new to the
courts and, accordingly, several cases have dealt with it.
For example, in a recent case, State Farm Fire and Casualty
Company v. Von Per Lieth,12 the homeowners asserted that their "all
risk" policy should cover loss due to third party negligence.
However, State Farm claimed the more immediate cause of the damage
was earth movement and water damage, both items excluded under the
policy.

In the Van Per Lieth case, there were "several causes of

the loss: (i) earth movement caused by rising ground water levels,
and (ii) negligence of certain entities parties in failing to take
proper measures to preserve the mesa."13

The California Supreme

Court, in reversing its Court of Appeals and holding for the
homeowners, stated:
When a loss is caused by a combination of a covered and
specifically excluded risks, the loss is covered if the
covered risk is the efficient proximate cause of loss. .
. . [T]he loss is not covered if the covered risk was
only a remote cause of the loss, or the excluded risk was
the efficient proximate, or predominate cause.14
Once again, the stipulated facts of the case which is now before
this Court state that the efficient proximate cause—the "as a
result" cause—was the freezing the bursting of the main water
line, which cause is a covered peril. Therefore, according to the
Van Per Lieth rationale, Alfs* damages should be covered under the

12

2 Calf. Rptr. 2d 183 (Calf. 1991).

13

Id. at 189.

14

Id. at 189.
6

policy because a covered peril, a frozen and broken water line, was
the efficient and proximate cause of the damage.15
As another example, in Garnett v. Transamerica Insurance
Services,16 the Idaho Supreme Court was called upon to examine a
similar issue. The policy in that case contained a lead-in clause
similar to the one now before the Court which purportedly excluded
losses "occasioned directly or indirectly by enforcement of any
ordinance or law."17

The insurer had denied coverage because

certain repairs to the damaged property were required by a building
code.18

In finding for the insured, the Court held:

As we read this provision it does not limit
Transamerica's obligation for the cost of repair or
replacement of the building when a loss has occurred that
is covered by the policy, but merely states if the loss
itself is caused by an ordinance or law, there is no
coverage. For instance, if some safety improvement of a
building to which no other loss had occurred were
required by an ordinance or law, Transamerica would not
be liable.
However, when the cost of repairing or
replacing a building that had been damaged by fire is
increased by the requirements of an ordinance or law,
Transamerica is not relieved of that cost.19

15

See also Garvev v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. . 48 Cal.
3d 395, 770 P.2d 704, 257 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1989) (when determining
whether insurance coverage exists under an "all-risk" homeowners
policy when the loss to the insured property can be attributed to
two causes, one of which is a non-excluded peril, and the other is
an excluded peril, the courts are to find coverage only if the nonexcluded is the efficient proximate cause of the loss).
16

800 P.2d 656 (Idaho 1990).

17

Id. at 662

18

Id,

19

Id. at 666.
7

The Idaho Court's analysis is that where the loss is the
proximate result of a covered peril, then the lead-in clause does
not operate to preclude coverage.

However, if the sole or

proximate cause of the loss were an excluded peril, then there
would be no coverage.
The same analysis should be applied in the case now before
this Court. The proximate cause of Alfs1 loss was a covered peril,
the bursting of a water pipe.

The lead-in clause should not be

applied to defeat coverage when the excluded event, earth movement,
is not the sole or proximate cause of the loss.
Point II
Summary Judgment, as Decided, was Improper
Because
the Determination
of
Efficient
Proximate Cause is a Factual Issue Properly
Decided by the Trier Fact
A.

Efficient Proximate Cause is the Law in Utah

The Efficient Proximate Cause Rule is set forth in Couch On
Insurance 2d:
In determining whether a loss is within an
exception in a policy, where there is a
concurrency of different causes, the efficient
cause—the one that sets others in motion—is
the cause to which the loss is to be
attributed, even though the other causes may
follow it, and operate more immediately in
producing the disaster.20
In this case now before this Court, the movement of the earth
may have operated more immediately in producing the damage, but the
predominating or efficient proximate cause of the loss was the
accidental freezing and bursting of the plumbing system.
20

Couch On Insurance 2.d §1466 (emphasis added) .
8

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this efficient proximate
cause analysis and applied it to determine the efficient proximate
cause when multiple, potential causes of damage are advanced:
The standard definition of proximate cause is
"that cause which, in natural and continuous
sequence,
(unbroken
by
an
efficient
intervening cause), produces the injury and
without which the result would not have
occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one
that necessarily sets in operation the factors
that accomplish the injury.21
In Koncilia v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.,22 the Colorado
Supreme Court dealt with the identical issues which are now before
this Court.

In the Koncilia case, the home owners policy insured

against loss occurring as a result of accidental discharge, leakage
or overflow of water from a plumbing system.

A broken water pipe

caused water to soak into the ground beneath the house causing the
ground to subside and the house to settle and crack.
denied

on

the

basis

of

an

exclusion

clause

Coverage was

containing

the

following:
(2) caused by, resulting from, contributed to,
or aggravated by any earth movement including
but not limited to earthquake, volcanic
eruption, landslide, mud flow, earth sinking,
rising or slightly;
(3) caused by, resulting from, contributed to,
or aggravated by any of the following:
. . .

(c) water below the surface of the ground.23

21

Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah
1985)(quoting State v. Lawson. 688 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 1984)).
22

528 P.2d 939 (Colo. App. 1974).

^Id. at 940.
9

In the Koncilia case, the trial court held that the loss had
been proximately caused by water escaping within the plumbing
system and was therefore a covered

loss.

It construed the

exclusion to apply only to underground water which had not escaped
from the domestic system or to earth movements caused by anything
other than accidental discharge from this system.

In confirming

the lower court, the Colorado Supreme Court held:
When, in determining coverage, the policy
provisions are inconsistent, or when read
together they give rise to an ambiguity as to
the extent of the policy coverage, the
contract should be construed in favor of
coverage and against limitations which would
inure to the benefit of the insurance company
which, by their draftsmanship created the
ambiguity.
This principle is applicable to
coverage as well as to exclusions and
conditions.
. . . Additionally, if the insurer intended to
omit from coverage that part of the plumbing
system which is below the surface of the
ground when it specifically insures the
overall plumbing system, it should have done
so expressly.24
Likewise, in King v. Travellers Insurance Co.,25 the New
Mexico Supreme Court analyzed an insurance policy's coverage where
the policy covered damages to due an accidental discharge from
within a plumbing system and an exclusion with regard to water
below the surface of the ground.

The parties in the King case

stipulated that a galvanized line under the floor broke allowing
water to escape and erode the soil, causing the floor to buckle.
The insurance company argued that the break in the line was caused
Id. at 941.
505 P.2d 1226 (N.M. 1973).

by electrolysis, a chemical reaction, and therefore was not an
"accidental discharge," and the resulting damage was from water
below the surface of the ground.

In comparing the policy's

statement of coverage with the policy's exception clause, the Court
discussed two alternatives

leading to the same result.

The

exception was either an irreconcilable conflict with and repugnant
to the insurance clause, or must be so construed that its meaning
will be harmonized with the insuring clause:
Appellee [insurance company] ignores the fact
that a great part of many plumbing systems, by
necessity, are installed below the ground.
Presumably, if an insurer desires to exclude
from coverage that part of the plumbing system
which is below the surface of the ground after
specifically insuring the overall plumbing
system, it could have done so.26
This efficient proximate cause and "fair effect" positions
have been accepted in the vast majority of jurisdiction where
court's have confronted these identical issues.27

Id. at 1232.
^Ferndale Development Co., v. Great American Insurance Co.,
527 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1974) (holding that the terms "flood" and
"surface water" in an exclusion clause do not include water
flooding from a broken valve on a city water line); Broome v.
Allstate Insurance Co.. 241 S.E.2d 34 (Ga. 1977); New Hampshire
Insurance Co. v. Robertson. 352 So. 2d 1307 (Miss. 1977) (earth
movement exclusion relates to natural forces, not from water
leaking from a plumbing system); Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Co. v. Phelps. 294 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1974) (exclusion for "water
below the surface" does not include coverage of a leak in
underground plumbing system) ; Contanucci v. Reliance Insurance Co. ,
349 N.Y.S.2d 187 (N.Y. 1973) (exclusion for "water below the
surface" does not include coverage for a broken a sewer line);
Thompson v. Occidental Life Insurance Co.. 513 P.2d 353 (Cal.
1973); Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. North Eastern New
Mexico Fair Association. 508 P.2d 588 (N.M. 1973); Outdoor World v.
Continental Casualty Co., 594 P.2d 546 (Az. 1979).
11

B.

Determination of Efficient Proximate Cause is a
Matter for the Trier of Fact

The lower court had a basis for determining that the broken
water pipe was the efficient proximate cause of the damage.
However, the lower court had no basis in the stipulated facts and
the findings of fact for a conclusion of law that earth movement
was the efficient proximate cause.
Because the question of whether an included risk or an
excluded risk was the efficient proximate cause of the damage is a
question for the trier of fact, the lower court erred in granting
summary judgment for State Farm. "Coverage should be determined by
a jury under an efficient proximate cause of analysis. Accordingly,
bearing in mind the facts here, we conclude the question of
causation is for the jury to decide."28 In the Von Per Leith case,
the California Supreme Court reiterated, "{T}he question of what
caused the loss is generally a question of fact, and the loss is
not covered if the covered risk is only a remote cause of the loss,
or the excluded risk was the efficient proximate or predominate
cause. "29
C. The Stipulation of the Parties does not
Support a Determination that Earth Movement
was the Efficient Proximate Cause

28

Garvey v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. . 770 P.2d 704, 48
Cal. 3d, 395, 257 Calf. Rptr. 292, 302-303 (1989).
29

Von Per Leith. 2 Calf. Rptr. 2d 183, 189 (Cal. 1991).
12

The parties stipulated to certain facts.30

The only facts

that relate to the issue of efficient proximate cause are as
follows:
5. On or about February 15, 1989, while this
policy was in full force and effect, and
during a time when the home was fully occupied
by Plaintiffs and not under construction, the
main water line to the home, in an area where
it runs under the tennis court of the
Plaintiffs' and to the residence, froze and
burst
as
a
result
of
unusually
low
temperatures occurring in the County of Salt
Lake, State of Utah..
6. As a result of the freezing and bursting
of the main water line, large volumes of water
escaped [sic] from the water line causing
extensive flooding and washing away of soil
undermining the tennis court, driveway and
fences and other structures on Plaintiffs1
premises and causing damage thereto.31
As argued in the first point of this brief, the only plausible
interpretation

of

these

stipulated

facts,

according

to

the

definition of efficient proximate cause,32 is that the frozen pipe
was the efficient proximate cause of the damage.

For the lower

court to have ruled otherwise—if it even addressed the issue of
efficient proximate cause somewhere between the lines—the lower
court had to have made a factual determination that the frozen,
broken pipe was not the efficient proximate cause and that the
earth movement was the efficient proximate cause.

^Statement of Facts, R. 40-41.
31

Id.

32

See definition of Efficient Proximate Cause, infra, n. 20 and
accompanying text.

In other words, the lower court had (and this Court has) the
stipulated facts upon which it can rule that the frozen broken
pipes are the efficient proximate cause of damage. The stipulated
facts state that the damage occurred "as a result of the freezing
and bursting of the main water line."33 However, there is no basis
in the Stipulated Facts upon which the lower court could rule that
earth movement was the efficient proximate cause.
lower

court, without

ignoring

the

application

Therefore, the
of

efficient

proximate cause, could not have properly decided this factual
issue.

For the lower court to decide how it did, it had to either

(1) ignore the application of efficient proximate cause or (2) make
a determination of fact which was not supported by the parties'
stipulation or the findings of fact.
Therefore, Summary Judgment as decided was improper.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Supreme Court has stated:
An insured is entitled to the broadest
protection he could have reasonably understood
to be provided by the policy.34
This mandate should underscore this Court's consideration of
these issues presented on appeal.
The lower court erred, as a matter of law, in its summary
judgment

ruling

because

Village

Inn

v.

State

Farm

is

not

determinative of the issue of law before this Court because it does

^Stipulated Facts, fl6.
^Fuller v. Directors of Finance. 694 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah
1985) .
14

not address efficient proximate cause. Alfs advanced the efficient
proximate cause argument in the lower court, the lower court based
its Summary Judgment ruling entirely on the Village Inn case, and
Village Inn does not address the issue of efficient proximate
cause. According to the stipulated statement of facts and findings
of fact, the efficient proximate cause is the "freezing and
bursting of the main water line."
Further, summary judgment, as decided was improper because
the determination of efficient proximate cause is a factual issue
properly decided by the trier of fact.

Efficient proximate cause

is the law, the determination of efficient proximate cause is a
matter for the trier of fact, and the stipulation of the parties
does not support a determination that earth movement was the
efficient proximate cause. Therefore, Summary Judgment as decided
was improper.
We therefore respectfully request a reversal of the lower
court's summary judgment ruling, a ruling that the frozen and
broken pipes were the efficient proximate cause of the damages, an
application of the strictissimi juris rule against State Farm and
a remand to determine damages.
Dated this 27th day of July, 1992.
FETZER, HENDRICKSON & SIMONSEN

Patrick S. Hendrickson

15
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